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which the status quo is kept, the status quo may be kept in situations where the
planner would prefer the reform, or the reform is passed when the planner prefers
the status quo. On the other hand, using an approval quorum, i.e. a threshold on
the number of voters expressing a ballot in favor of the reform below which the
status quo is kept, we show that those drawbacks of participation quorums are
avoided. Moreover, an electoral system with approval quorum performs better
than one with participation quorum even when the planner wishes to implement
the corresponding participation quorum social choice function.
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Abstract We study direct democracy with population uncertainty. Voters’ partici-
pation is often among the desiderata by the election designer. We show that with a
participation quorum, i.e. a threshold on the fraction of participating voters below
which the status quo is kept, the status quo may be kept in situations where the planner
would prefer the reform, or the reform is passed when the planner prefers the status
quo. On the other hand, using an approval quorum, i.e. a threshold on the number of
voters expressing a ballot in favor of the reform below which the status quo is kept,
we show that those drawbacks of participation quorums are avoided. Moreover, an
electoral system with approval quorum performs better than one with participation
quorum even when the planner wishes to implement the corresponding participation
quorum social choice function.
1 Introduction
Direct democracy, in the form of referenda and initiatives, are used in many countries
for decision making. Beside Switzerland and the United States, their use has spread
out to many European countries and Australia.1 As mentioned by Casella and Gelman
1 See e.g. Matsusaka (2005a, b) for an account of the increasing use of direct democracy around the
world.
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(2008), in US states the number of referenda has increased in every decade since 1970,
at an average rate of seventy per cent per decade.
In all referendum or initiative electoral rules, there is some form of minimum
(absolute or relative) support requirement. In some cases (take Switzerland for exam-
ple) there is a minimum number of signatures to put an initiative to vote, but there is no
minimum turnout requirement in the actual vote; in contrast, in many other cases there
is also an additional “quorum” requirement at the time of the vote. Quorums are a sim-
ple way of protecting the status quo. The subset of voters who proposed the reform (or
lobbyists) have had the time to think of it and tomeasure the gain they can draw from the
reform. It may be the case that voters who are currently indifferent between the status
quo and the reformwould prefer the status quo if theywere better informed or if the cost
of votingwere smaller. As stated inQvortrup (2002), the rationale for a turnout require-
ment is that “a low turnout in referendums is seen as a threat to their legitimacy”.2
Legitimacy, however, may have multiple meanings: the two most frequently used
types of legitimacy turnout requirements are the so called “participation quorum” and
“approval quorum.” When a participation quorum is imposed, an electoral outcome is
considered legitimate if enough voters turn out, hence legitimacy is due to a sufficiently
large set of citizens who care enough and have clear enough preferences. On the other
hand, the approval quorum is a minimum required number of votes in support of the
proposal, and hence legitimacy is in terms of aminimal strength of the absolute support
for a reform, regardless of whether the rest of the population care or not or whether
they have clear preferences or not.3
In this paper, we aim to show the superiority of approval over participation quorums
in the following sense: when an absolute minimum approval for the reform is part of
the desiderata of a social planner, the approval quorum rules do implement efficiently
those social preferences; but the same is not true for a social planner whose legitimacy
concerns are in terms of participation: participation based social preferences are not
well served by participation quorum rules. Moreover, an approval quorum dominates
a participation quorum because it does better even in the latter “territory,” i.e. leading
to outcomes that are closer to what is recommended by social objectives defined in
terms of participation.
The large incentive-to-abstain problemwith a high participation quorumhas already
been discussed in other papers, especially with reference to Italian experiences.4
2 See also LeDuc (2003) for a discussion of the fear to have a minority of the population prevail over a
passive majority.
3 Among the examples of participation quorums used in reality, the Italian example is the most used, even if
similar quorums exist in other countries. For the approval quorum type of rules, on the other hand, Germany
is the most recognized example. See Corte-Real and Pereira (2004) for a description of the various types
of turnout requirements used in the world and for an axiomatic discussion.
4 In Italian politics, from 1996 until 2011, all popular referenda have failed because of low voter turnout
(30% or lower). More specifically, referenda in 1997 (seven bills, various topics including hunting, abolish-
ing agrarianministry, and conscientious objectors), 1999 (elimination of PR), 2000 (seven bills, dealingwith
electoral law, unions, and judges), 2003 (rehiring illegally fired workers and electricity on private property),
2005 (stem cells and IVF), 2009 (electoral law) all failed. The clearest case of strategic abstention was for
the 2005 referendum: overall turnout was only 24–26%, and is thought to be low due to encouragement
from Vatican and Catholic bishops to abstain. For the four initiatives, of those voting approximately 88%
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We study the consequences of this incentive to abstain when voters are strategic and
there is some population uncertainty, that is, the number of voters actually casting their
ballot is a random variable. We confirm that it is rational for supporters of the status
quo to abstain, with two potential types of “mistakes:” first, as it is well-known, there
are profiles of voters’ preferences under which the status quo is kept even though the
majority of citizens would have favored the reform. In addition, surprisingly, there are
other profiles of preferences in which the reform is passed even though the majority
is in favor of the status quo.5
With an approval quorum, which requires a minimum number of votes in favor of
the reform in order to pass it (on top, of course, of a majority of votes casted), all the
incentives to abstain disappear. More precisely, we show that sincere voting is always
rational and is the only rational way of voting under this type of rules. Consequently,
approval quorum rules implement approval based social preferences. The same factor,
namely the huge difference in terms of incentives to abstain between the two quorum
rules, is responsible for making an approval quorum a better way of implementing
even participation based social preferences.
Using a participation quorum there exist bad equilibria with low participation,
often voluntarily induced by strategic leaders who want to inhibit an effective use of
direct democracy. On the other hand, with an approval quorum no equilibrium exists
without sincere behavior and efficient aggregation of preferences or information. These
comparative results holdwhenwe view the elections as preference aggregation devices
as well as when we view them as information aggregation devices, hence the results
are very robust if one accepts the methodological focus on rational individual strategic
voting.6
Studying strategic voting in large elections raiseswell knowndifficulties: any voting
profile such that no voter is pivotal for the outcome of the election is an equilibrium, as
no voter can profitably deviate. As a consequence, the set of Nash equilibria is large.
It is therefore impossible to explain the regularities one observes in large elections,
including the ones about large abstention in referendum with quorums, using standard
Footnote 4 continued
were for eliminating research limitations and 78% for allowing IVF. In 2009 the questionwas on eliminating
connection between lists and givingmajority prize to coalition of lists in theChamber ofDeputies andSenate,
respectively. Turnout was 23% for both (and of those voters, 22% voted against); and for eliminating the
ability of a candidate to stand for election inmore than one constituency, turnout was 23% (with 13% voting
against). See http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/06/italys-referendums. See also Herrera
and Mattozzi (2010), Hizen and Shinmyo (2011), and Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhaes (2010a), who find
evidence from cross country data from 1970 to 2007. See also Zwart (2009) for a discussion of how “high”
a participation quorum should be, conditional on having chosen to have one.
5 See Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhaes (2010b) for a different analysis of this second type of mistake.
6 If one believes that elections should be studied focusing on parties’ “mobilization” efforts rather than
on individual strategic voting, then the key difference between approval and participation quorums that
we emphasize becomes undiscernable. This is why Herrera and Mattozzi (2010), using a mobilization
model, found no substantial difference between participation and approval quorums, even if they find that
parties may face the two kinds of mistakes that we describe above. Similarly, the two quorum rules are also
difficult to compare when using ethical voting models like Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) or Coate and
Conlin (2004), because in ethical voting models voters (if guided by the same type of group utilitarianism)
are assumed to coordinate as if they were mobilized by a leader.
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assumptions. A long series of models have provided solutions to this problem, all
introducing some ingredients that make some pivotal probabilities always positive.
Such ingredients can be uncertainty about preferences of other voters (see e.g. Fed-
dersen and Pesendorfer 1997), perceived probabilities of tie events (see e.g. Myerson
and Weber 1993), or uncertainty about the actual number of voters. This population
uncertainty has been modeled in two ways. Sometimes it is assumed that the number
of players is fixed but each player has a fixed probability of not participating in the
election, so that the number of actual voters is distributed according to some binomial
distribution (see e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996; Laslier 2009). Alternatively,
the number of players is assumed to be Poisson distributed (see e.g. Feddersen and
Pesendorfer 1999; Myerson 2000). We follow the latter assumption.
Myerson (1998) proved that such Poisson games are characterized by two proper-
ties: action independence, implying that the numbers of voters of each type choosing
any action are independently distributed; and environmental equivalence, implying
that a player of any type considers a probability distribution of types of the other
players identical to the one for the game itself. These two properties will be used
below and make the analysis of the voting game quite simple. The key mechanism we
highlight thanks to the assumption of population uncertainty works as follows. Under
a participation quorum, a status quo supporter always faces the dilemma that her vote
may be pivotal in reaching the quorum at the benefit of the reform, or her vote may
be pivotal in favor of the status quo if one vote is needed to obtain a majority against
the reform. We prove that the former tie event is more likely than the latter one even
if the quorum is expected to be reached.
Several authors have recently used Myerson’s theory of large Poisson games to
analyze strategic voting in large elections. Though some authors have used it for
positive objectives (see e.g. Castanheira 2003; Herrera et al. 2012; Bouton 2009), that
theory has mainly been used to discuss voting rules normatively (see, for instance,
Myerson 1998, 2002; Bouton and Castanheira 2012; Goertz andManiquet 2010). Our
contribution is mainly normative and the clear conclusion we draw is that approval
quorum should be preferred to participation quorums.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we describe the basic model, in which
there is population uncertainty but no individual information problem, in the sense that
each citizen knows exactly what alternative would be best for her. Section 3 contains
the analysis of the model and Sect. 4 highlights the main result. In Sect. 5 we extend
our result to the case in which there are independent citizens whose preferences for
reform or status quo depend on the state of Nature, which is uncertain. In Sect. 6 we
conclude with some brief remarks. All technical proofs are in the “Appendix”.
2 Model
An electorate is called to decide whether to reform a status quo policy or not. The real
voting population is uncertain. We assume it is Poisson distributed, with expected size
n. For sufficiently large n, the Poisson distribution is close to the binomial one, that
is, our assumption is close to assuming that each citizen in a population of size np has
an independent probability p of being selected by nature to go to vote.
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Fig. 1 participation quorum
social preferences
A fraction θ S of citizens is realized to strictly prefer the status quo, a fraction
θ R have opposite preferences, and the remaining fraction of citizens are indifferent
between the two options. Consequently, the number of actual citizens preferring S to
R (resp., R to S) is Poisson distributed with expected value θ Sn (resp., θ Rn), with
θ S + θ R ≤ 1.
2.1 Conservative social preferences
The social planner does not know the exact distribution of preferences and is assumed
to be biased in favor of the status quo. Hence her objective is to design rules that
would make reforms pass only when the support for such reforms is “sufficiently
clear” or “sufficiently strong”. There are at least two different “incarnations” of this
conservative bias:7
1. Participation Quorum Social Preferences (PQSP): R is the socially preferred out-
come if and only if the realized numbers of supporters are θ Sn < θ Rn and the total
number of agentswith strict preferences is above some threshold, (θ S+θ R)n ≥ qn,
for some q ∈ [0, 1]—see Fig. 1;
2. Approval Quorum Social Preferences (AQSP): R is the socially preferred outcome
if and only if θ Sn < θ Rn and there is a sufficiently large absolute number of
supporters of the reform, i.e., θ Rn ≥ q̂n, for some q̂ ∈ [0, 1]—see Fig. 2.8
7 We define social preferences in terms of expected vote shares. We could have defined them in terms of
actual vote shares. Given that we concentrate on equilibria in sufficiently large populations, the difference
between the two, that is, the probability that the recommendation of social preferences based on expected
shares differs from that based on actual shares, is negligible.
8 The quorums are expressed here in terms of absolute numbers of voters. They could not be expressed in
fraction terms, as our population is potentially unbounded, due to our assumption of a Poisson distribution.
This distribution, however, can be viewed as an approximation of a binomial distribution, where our n
parameter corresponds to the expected number of interested citizens, pN , where N would be the actual
size of the population and p the common probability of being called (by nature) to go to vote. With this
interpretation, the quorums, in terms of a fraction of N , are pq and pq̂.
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Fig. 2 q̂-approval quorum
social preferences
In summary, sufficiently clear can relate to the number of people whomanifest their
strict preferences or to the absolute support for the reform. Both these social prefer-
ences reflect a conservative bias. The difference is that the first type of preferences
imposes that enough people in the electorate should have clear (strict) preferences;
the second type of social preferences instead just require a minimum dimension of the
class of people demanding the reform, regardless of the intensity of preferences of the
rest of the population.
To clarify the logic behind these two types of social preferences, consider the
example of q = 0.5 and qˆ = 0.25. If only 30 percent of the population eligible to
vote has a strict preference but 99 percent of such voters are in favor of the reform, the
preference for the reform would be considered sufficiently clear by a planner focused
on the minimal absolute support requirement of AQSP, whereas the presence of 70
percent of indifferent citizens would induce the planner with PQSP to consider the
status quo as the preferred option even though 99 percent of the voters with strict
preferences are for the reform. Rather than disputing which of these types of social
preferences are themost reasonable, we simply notice that both seem to exist in reality9
andmove to the evaluation of the way inwhich they are and/or should be implemented.
2.2 Voting rules
What electoral rules should a planner design, as a function of her social preferences?
At the time of the referendum, all citizens who are selected by nature to have the
opportunity to vote may choose to vote for S, for R, or to abstain. NS will denote
9 SeeVenice Commission (2005) for the underpinnings of the various existing rules. One potential rationale
for participation requirements, already mentioned in the introduction, is the fear that the majority of voters
could be insufficiently informed and insufficiently motivated to express a preference for the status quo
even though their total utility is negatively affected by the reform, which is instead pushed through by an
informed and motivated minority.
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the number of voters who actually vote for the status quo, and N R for the reform. We
assume that indifferent citizens always choose to abstain.
Consider two existing electoral rules that constitute the most intuitive voting game
form candidates for implementation of social preferences PQSP and AQSP respec-
tively:
1. Under the participation quorum electoral rule (PQER), the outcome of the election
is R if and only if NS < N R and the total number of non-abstaining citizens,
NS + N R , is larger than the threshold qn.
2. Under the approval quorum electoral rule (AQER), the outcome of the election is
R if and only if NS < N R and N R is larger than the threshold q̂n.
One would think that PQER should be the best rule to implement PQSP, and AQER
should be used to implement AQSP. Surprisingly, we will show that this intuitive
connection is false, and in fact AQER “dominates” PQER, in a sense to be clarified
below, even when social preferences are PQSP.
2.3 Strategies and equilibrium concept
Citizens know θ S and θ R but they are uncertain about the exact population of actual
voters. For all population parameters, a strategy is a choice of voting behavior for each
of the two types of citizens with strict preferences (given that indifferent citizens are
assumed to abstain). We assume everyone maximizes expected utility, and we look for
stable (with respect to small perturbations of the strategies10) BayesianNash equilibria
involving non-dominated strategies for sufficiently large n.11
3 Analysis
We begin by studying the citizens’ best response functions and the resulting equilibria
for each of the two voting game forms described above.
The two game forms share a few characteristics. Voting for R (resp., for S) is a
weakly dominated strategy for citizens preferring S (resp., R). Therefore, such citizens
only consider abstaining versus voting for their preferred outcome.
Let any citizen who prefers S decide to actually vote with probability σ . Then, the
total number of votes for S is a Poisson of mean σθ Sn, that is,
Prob(NS = k) = e
−σθ Sn(σθ Sn)k
k! .
10 It is the same stability requirement as in, for instance, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996). When there
are three equilibria, this stability requirement rules out the intermediate equilibrium, as any perturbation of
the expectations of other players’ behavior make all agents shift towards the strategies that form one of the
other two equilibria (which, of course, are stable in that sense).
11 Given that we have an unbounded number of potential players, describing individual strategies and
considering asymmetric equilibria would be complex. In the symmetric equilibrium that we select all
agents of any given type use the same voting strategy.
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3.1 AQER game form
The difference in expected utility between voting for one’s preferred outcome and
abstaining comes from the probability of being pivotal. The key observation for a
citizen preferring S (resp., R) is that the only possibility for her to affect the outcome of
the election is making it switch from R to S (resp., from S to R), and these possibilities
occur with probability
Prob(NS = N R − 1 and N R ≥ q̂n)
(resp.,
Prob(NS = N R and N R ≥ q̂n − 1)).
There is no swing voter’s curse in such elections. Hence, the expected utility derived
from voting for one’s preferred outcome is either zero or strictly positive, as the proba-
bilities above are either zero or strictly positive. Abstaining is then aweakly dominated
strategy. As a result, a sincere profile, with every voter voting for her preferred out-
come if she is called by nature to vote, is a stable Bayesian Nash equilibrium involving
undominated strategies.
Given population uncertainty, it could happen that θ Sn > θ Rn > q̂n whereas
N R > NS > q̂n, so that the reform is passed when the planner strictly prefers
the status quo. The most likely event, however, is that the planner’s preferences are
satisfied.Let us remember that asn becomes arbitrarily large, all themass of probability
is concentrated arbitrarily close to themost likely event. Therefore, as n goes to infinity,
the standard deviation around the mean,
√
θ Sn is arbitrarily small compared to the
mean, and NS (resp., N R) is arbitrarily close to θ Sn (resp., θ Rn) and the optimal
outcome is implemented with a probability tending to 1.
3.2 PQER game form
Under PQER, citizens who prefer the reform can never influence the outcome in their
favor by abstaining, hence abstaining is a weakly dominated strategy for them. All
those citizens vote for R if they happen to vote.
For agents who prefer the status quo, on the other hand, there is the following
strategic voting problem: adding one vote in favor of the status quo may change the
outcome of the election from the status quo to the reform if this vote is pivotal in
reaching the quorum and the reform has the majority of votes. On the other hand,
adding one vote in favor of the status quo may also be pivotal for the status quo, if
the quorum is already reached and the reform is one vote ahead of the status quo.
Consequently, the expected utility of voting for S instead of abstaining depends on
Prob(NS = N R − 1 and NS + N R ≥ qn)
− Prob(NS < N R − 1 and NS + N R = qn − 1),
where N R is Poisson distributed with mean θ Rn.
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Let us consider a citizen who prefers S. If all other citizens of her type have decided
to abstain, then Prob(NS = N R − 1 and NS + N R ≥ qn) = 0 whereas the other
probability is strictly positive. This proves that abstaining is not weakly dominated.
Consequently, finding an equilibrium amounts to finding the equilibrium value of the
probability σ with which citizens preferring S actually vote for S. From what has
already been said, we can derive the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Under the participation quorum electoral rules, for all θ S, θ R, the partici-
pation game admits an equilibrium where σ = 0, that is, where all citizens preferring
the status quo abstain.
Proof Let θ S, θ R be given. Assume all citizens of type S (those who strictly prefer
the status quo) but one choose σ = 0. Then, for all n ∈ N,
Prob(NS = N R − 1 and NS + N R ≥ qn) = 0,
whereas
Prob(NS < N R − 1 and NS + N R = qn − 1)
= Prob(N R = qn − 1) = e
−θ Rn(θ Rn)qn−1
(qn − 1)! > 0,
so that for all n ∈ N: σ = 0 is a best response, proving the claim. unionsq
Equipped with this lemma, we are now able to characterize the set of outcomes
that, as a function of the parameters θ S, θ R of the population, are supported by an
equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Under the participation quorum electoral rules, the set of electoral out-
comes supported by an equilibrium is the function of the parameters θ S, θ R illustrated
below.
Proof See the “Appendix”. unionsq
This result reveals that there are two regions of parameters where the set of possible
electoral outcomes does not coincide with what the planner would have chosen, had
she known the preferences of the electorate. The first region (region 3 in the proof,
where θ R < q, θ R > θ S, and θ R + θ S > q) is composed of the populations where
the defenders of the reform are more numerous than the defenders of the status quo,
but are not sufficient, by themselves, to reach the quorum. By abstaining, therefore,
the defenders of the status quo succeed in preventing the reform from being voted.
That is the already known effect of participation quorums, the Italian story. Observe
that the undesired equilibrium is the only one for a large subset of parameters in this
region.
There is a second region of parameters with an undesirable outcome (region 6
in the proof, where θ S > θ R > q): when supporters of the status quo are more
numerous than the defenders of the reform, but the latter are sufficiently numerous
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Fig. 3 The possible electoral outcomes under a q-participation quorum
to reach the quorum by themselves, there exists an equilibrium where all citizens
preferring the status quo abstain, but the quorum is reached and the reform passes.
Population uncertainty is the crucial ingredient yielding this result. It is indeed rational
for status quo supporters to abstain, because, given the uncertainty about the actual
voting population, the probability of being pivotal in favor of the reform bymaking the
number of voters reach the quorum, even if the quorum is expected to be reached, is
larger than the probability of being pivotal in favor of the status quo. The consequence
is that the reform is passed, whereas sincere voting would have confirmed society’s
preference towards the status quo, in an electoral system protecting it.
In terms of plausibility of the “bad” equilibria we identified, the general abstention
of region 6 by supporters of the status quo when the expected number of voters in favor
of the reform is largely above the quorum is less plausible than general participation.
But when the expected number of voters in favor of the reform is only slightly above
the quorum, then it seems extremely plausible that supporters of the status quo try to
enforce it by abstaining.
4 Main comparative result
Figure 1 tells us what the electoral designer exhibiting participation quorum social
preferences would decide if she were completely informed about the citizens’ pref-
erences. Figure 3 tells us what this planner actually implements by introducing a
123
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participation quorum. As pointed out in the previous section, the two figures do not
coincide. Figure 2 tells us what this planner would have implemented had she intro-
duced an approval quorum in the electoral system. Here comes our central result: the
set of population parameters for which the outcome of the elections coincides with
the preference of the planner is larger under an approval than under a participation
quorum.
Before we prove this claim formally, we remark that we take a point of view of
full implementation (all equilibrium outcomes should be socially optimal) as opposed
to partial implementation (there should exist at least one equilibrium supporting the
socially optimal outcome). The intuitivemotivation for this is that an electoral designer
who exhibits some risk aversion wishes to avoid to have an electoral outcome that does
not fit her social preferences when this can be avoided by choosing a set of rules that
eliminates the possibility of bad equilibria.
Theorem 1 The set of population parameters θ S, θ R for which the outcome of the
election coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences is larger under
a qˆ-approval quorum electoral rule with qˆ = q than under a q-participation quorum
electoral rule.
Proof Let q denote the value of the parameter describing the planner’s q-participation
quorum social preferences. The following statements follow from Lemma 2 and the
fact that citizens have a dominant strategy to vote sincerely in approval quorum elec-
tions:
1) If
either θ S ≤ θ R, and θ R ≥ q,
or θ S + θ R ≤ q
or θ S + θ R ≥ q, θ S ≥ θ R and θ R ≤ q,
then the outcome of the elections under either a q-participation or a qˆ-approval quorum
with qˆ = q coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences;
2) If
θ S + θ R ≥ q,
θ S ≤ θ R, and
θ R ≤ q,
then neither the outcome of the elections under a q-participation nor a qˆ-approval
quorum with qˆ = q coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences;
3) If
θ S ≥ θ R, and
θ R ≥ q,
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then the outcome of the elections under a qˆ-approval quorum with qˆ = q, that is, R,
coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences, whereas the outcome of
the elections under a q-participation quorum does not (as it is either R or S). unionsq
As a consequence, independently of whether the planner has participation or
approval quorum social preferences, she should introduce approval quorum in the
electoral rules.
The above theorem is based on the existence of regions of population parameters
in which the set of outcomes of the participation quorum elections differs from the set
of outcomes that are preferred by participation quorum social preferences. In one of
these regions, region 6 in the proof of lemma 2 and case 3 in the proof of Theorem 1,
there are equilibria that support the correct outcome, the status quo, but there are other
equilibria supporting the undesired outcome, the reform, whereas all the equilibria
under the approval quorum voting game support the correct outcome. A planner that
would be satisfied whenever her preferred outcome is supported by some equilibrium
could be finewith participation quorums. If, on the contrary, she demands her preferred
outcome to be supported by all equilibria, then she should prefer approval quorum.
The third case analyzed in the proof of the theorem corresponds to a region of
parameters (recall that it is region 6 in the proof of Lemma 2) that disappears when
q = 0.5 (if θ R ≥ q = 0.5, then it is impossible to have θ S ≥ θ R). Hence with
q = 0.5 the two types of quorum rules are equivalent in terms of implementation of
PQSP. In all other cases a participation quorum is strictly dominated ex ante by setting
an approval quorum with the same threshold.
5 Extensions
5.1 Supermajority
The starting assumption of our paper is that the social planner wishes to protect the
status quo. We have considered only quorum rules as instruments for this goal. An
immediate extension consists in assuming that, in addition to the quorum, the planner
imposes a supermajority for the reform to pass. Let us assume that the reform is
approved only if the participation quorum is reached and the reform receives m times
more votes than the status quo. By voting for S, a citizen is now pivotal in favor of S if
NS = int (mN R) − 1 and NS + N R ≥ qn, where int (x) denotes the integer value of
x . She is pivotal in favor of R if NS < int (mN R) − 1 and NS + N R = qn − 1. The
analysis carries over without any surprise, and a similar lemma as lemma 2 is easily
obtained, illustrated by a graph similar to the one of Fig. 3 except that the forty five
degree line is replaced with a line of slope m.
5.2 Cost of voting
In the model of the previous section, supporters of the reform have a dominant strategy
to vote for the reform. This is, of course, a simplification. With positive voting costs
for some voters, turnout is obviously affected. We did not include them in the analysis
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so far, because it is not clear how the normative analysis we have developed should
take them into account. However, it is interesting to look at how the equilibria we have
identified survive under the assumption that voting costs may be positive. To introduce
voting costs, voters’ utility should be redefined as depending on the outcome j of the
voting, j ∈ {R, S}, and on the cost, c,
uic = ui ( j) − c
where i ∈ {R, S} is the type of the voter, so that ui ( j) = 1 whenever i = j and
ui ( j) = 0 whenever i = j and c is distributed on some interval [c, c] such that
c ≤ 0 < c. The size of the voting population remains Poisson distributed, and each
agent called by nature to vote is characterized by a type i ∈ {R, S} and a voting cost
c ∼ F[c, c], where F denotes the distribution function of c.
It is clear that a new type of equilibrium arises, the equilibrium in which all voters
abstain. We already know that abstention may be the best strategy for all supporters of
the status quo. It becomes a best response of the supporters of the reform in two cases.
The first case is when θ R < q. If some supporters of the reform find the probability of
being pivotal too small compared to their voting cost, they will decide to abstain. This
will decrease the expected fraction of voters in favor of R below θ R, which, in turn,
decreases the probability of being pivotal even further. Consequently, more voters will
decide to stay home. For some distribution functionF , this will result in all supporters
of R abstaining.
The second case is when θ R > q. Assume all supporters of the status quo abstain.
The supporters of the reform who have the highest voting cost will decide to abstain
as well. Contrary to the previous case, this increases the probability of being pivotal.
This probability is maximized when the fraction σ of voters of type R is such that
σθ R = q. In that case, the probability of being pivotal, as a function of the expected
size of the voting population n, is equal to
p = e
−σθ Rn(σθ Rn)σθ Rn
σθ Rn! .





is not an equilibrium: more voters will decide to stay home, with the consequence
that the probability to be pivotal will decrease. Again, there are values of F for which
abstaining is the only best response to abstaining.
Let us assume that if θ R < q, then F(p) > q
θ R
. The other equilibria we identified
in the previous section remain possible under that assumption. We don’t think it is
possible to characterize them algebraically.12 A clear point to make, however, is that
voting costs may only make abstention more beneficial. The problematic equilibria
12 Castanheira (2003) succeeds in characterizing the equilibria in a model with Poisson uncertainty and
voting costs. A key step in his result is the explicit derivation of the probability of being pivotal. The same
strategy cannot be applied here, because the modified Bessel function that Castanheira uses cannot be used
to compute pivotal probabilities when the pivotal event depends on the sum of votes for two alternatives,
as it is the case with quorums.
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we find with voters of type S abstaining and the equilibrium outcome being S when
the planner would have preferred R and R when the planner would have preferred
S remain and are even more likely to take place. Again, the only difference between
the two types of quorum systems is that approval quorum does not give incentive to
supporters of the status quo to abstain. Voting costs, in summary, do not change the
picture.
5.3 Uncertain preferences aggregation
All the analysis so far rests on the assumption that there is no uncertainty about the
distribution of preferences. There are two cases of preference uncertainty, depending
on whether voters know their own preference or not. We study the former case in this
subsection, and the latter case in the following one.
Let us assume that parameters θ R and θ S are randomparameters, distributed accord-
ing to density function F(θ R, θ S). At the time of the ballot, each citizen knows her
type, but does not know the precise value of θ R and θ S . The analysis of this case turns
out to be very similar to the one of the previous sections.
Let us begin with PQER. It remains a dominant strategy for a citizen preferring
the reform to go to vote and to vote for the reform. We only need to determine the
equilibrium strategy of citizens preferring the status quo. Such a citizen will either
vote for the reform or abstain. Let σ determine the probability that the other citizens
preferring the status quo vote for the status quo. Remember that we are interested in
what happens for sufficiently large population. To compute her best response, a citizen
needs to maximize her expected utility conditionally on her vote being pivotal. It is
well known that this is equivalent tomaximize her expected utility conditionally on the
specific most likely event in which her vote is pivotal (see, for instance, the Magnitude
Theorem in Myerson 2000). In the setting of this subsection, this requires computing
the specific values of θ R and θ S that maximize the probability of a tie event.
For sufficiently large n, the most likely specific tie event in which this citizen is
pivotal in favor of the reform occurs when θ R + σθ S = q, θ R ≥ σθ S, and
N R = θ Rn
N S = σθ Sn.
Indeed, the parameter of a Poisson distribution (that is, θ Rn for the distribution of N R
and σθ Sn for the distribution of NS) is also the mode of the distribution.
For the same reason, the most likely specific tie event in which this citizen is pivotal
in favor of the status quo occurs when θ R + σθ S ≥ q, θ R = σθ S, and
N R = θ Rn
N S = σθ Sn.
A citizen wishing to maximize her expected utility will therefore choose her strategy
as a function of which of those two events is more likely. In case the former is more
likely, the citizen will abstain. In the opposite case, she will vote for the status quo. If
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the two probabilities are the same, she is indifferent between abstaining and voting,
but, for the same reason as in the previous section, an equilibrium of that kind would
not be stable.
Assume σ = 0. Exactly like in the previous section, the only possible pivotal events
are those in which that voter is pivotal in favor of the reform. Abstaining is therefore
always an equilibrium, even if the ex ante expected value of θ R is larger than q (and
the ex ante expected outcome is that the reform is passed).








For all voting games in which density function F satisfies this inequality, abstaining
is the only equilibrium. For all the other games, there are two equilibria, one in which
all citizens preferring the status quo abstain, and one in which they all vote for the
status quo.
The analysis of the AQER is immediate. The uncertainty about the preferences
of the other agents does not affect the behavior of the voters. It remains a dominant
strategy of all non-indifferent voters to vote for the alternative they prefer.
In conclusion, our results extend to the case of uncertainty about the preferences of
the others, even if they take a different shape. For some prior beliefs on the population
parameters, abstention by the supporters of the status quo is the unique equilibrium.
For the other prior beliefs, there are two equilibria, one in which all those voters
abstain, one in which they all vote for the status quo. As a consequence, we still obtain
the result that, ex post, the status quo is kept even if the social planner would have
preferred to move to the reform, and the opposite result that the reform is passed
whereas the social planner would have preferred to keep the status quo. This cannot
happen with approval quorum, so that the AQER ex post implements the AQSP, and
does better in terms of ex post implementing PQSP than the PQER.
5.4 Information aggregation
It is rather natural to think that the partisans of the reform, who have had the time
to study the issue and compute their costs and benefits, know their preferences with
certainty, but it is not clear whether all the other agents know what is in their best
interest. Moreover, we can even think that some citizens may be convinced that the
decision will affect their welfare but may be uncertain about the direction of change
in their welfare. In this section we show that, in this case as well, an approval quorum
voting rule is better than a participation one, for exactly the same reasons as above.
We change the model in the following manner: there is a fraction θ R of partisans
of the reform, and a fraction θ I of independent citizens, θ R + θ I ≤ 1. The others
are indifferent between the status quo and the reform. We assume that they abstain.
Independent citizens have the same preferences: they prefer the reform in state r , and
the status quo in state s. The two states of nature have prior probability πr and π s
respectively, πr +π s = 1. Among the independent citizens, a fraction γ are informed
about the state of nature, but the remaining (1−γ ) do not receive any information. All
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Fig. 4 The q-participation
quorum social preferences, as a
function of the state of nature
these parameters are common knowledge. This model is an extension of Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1996)’s model.
The two social preferences now depend on the state of nature. They are described in
the following figures. According to the q-participation quorum social preferences, in
state r the reform should be the outcome, except if less than q percent of the population
are concerned by the issue. In state s, the outcome should be the same as in the previous
section. According to the q̂-approval quorum social preferences, in state r the reform
should be the outcome except if less than q̂ percent of the population is supporting the
reform, exactly like with the other social preferences. In state s, the outcome should
be the same as in the previous section. Following Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996),
we now consider that elections aggregate information rather than preferences. We say
that information aggregation is efficient if the outcome of the election is the one that
the planner would have chosen had he known the true state of nature (Fig. 4).
Let us analyze the approval quorum game first. Partisans of the reform have, as
before, a dominant strategy to vote for the reform. Informed independent citizens can
condition their vote on the state of nature, which they observe. In state r , they can
only gain by voting for R, and in state s they can only gain by voting for S (abstaining
is a weakly dominated strategy). Their dominant strategy is therefore (R, S), which
reads: vote for R in r , for S in s (Fig. 5).
The situation is different for uninformed independent citizens. They have to choose
how to vote without knowing the state. On the other hand, they know that informed
citizens vote as a function of their information, so that the uninformed citizens’ strategy
should consist in maximising the probability that informed citizens be pivotal. Their
dilemma is that their vote for R can be needed in state r if partisans and informed
citizens are not sufficient to meet the quorum, but their vote for S can be needed in
state s if the informed citizens are not sufficient to out-balance the partisans, in case
these ones reach the threshold.
Let σR and σS denote the probability that an uninformed independent citizen votes
for the reform and the status quo, respectively. In state r , the expected fraction of
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Fig. 5 The q̂-approval quorum
social preferences, as a function
of the state of nature
the population voting for R is λR|r = θ R + (σR(1 − γ ) + γ )θ I , whereas a fraction
λS|r = σS(1 − γ )θ I is expected to vote for S. Similarly, λR|s = θ R + σR(1 − γ )θ I ,
and λS|s = (σS(1− γ ) + γ )θ I . Let us call Piv1 the event that a vote for S makes the
outcome of the election change from R to S, and Piv2 the event that a vote for R leads
the quorum to be reached and the outcome to change from S to R, that is (assuming











Prob(NS = k and N R = qn − 1).
From the analysis and the comparison of these crucial events, we can show that
approval quorum rules determine no information inefficiency:
Lemma 3 Under the approval quorum electoral rule, the outcome of the election
coincides with the approval quorum social preferences for all population θ I , θ R.
Proof See the “Appendix”. unionsq
Rational voting under an approval quorum voting rule is not as simple with prefer-
ence uncertainty as without. But the lemma proves that an approval quorum surpris-
ingly does not prevent efficient information aggregation: the outcome is always the
same as what it would be if uninformed independent citizens were actually informed.
Here is the intuition of this result. Given that there is no way of making a mistake
under approval quorum when a citizen knows her preferences, the partisans of the
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reform have a dominant strategy to vote for it (as previously) and the informed inde-
pendent citizens to vote for R in r and S in s. The only delicate question is for the
uninformed independent citizens.
Let us illustrate their optimal strategy numerically.13 Assume q̂ = 0.20, θ R =
0.10, γ θ I = 0.05 and (1 − γ )θ R = 0.40. The dilemma of the uninformed indepen-
dents is that they should vote for R in r , as the other voters are not numerous enough to
make R reach the quorum, but they should not vote “too much” for R, as they still like
S better in state s. This is achieved, for instance, if they choose the following mixed
strategy: with probability 0.20, they vote for R, otherwise they abstain. As a result,
R is expected to obtain (10+5+0.20*40=) 23% of votes in r , so that the quorum is
reached, and only (10+0.20*40=) 18% in s, which guarantees the election of S.
Assume now that q̂ = 0.20, θ R = 0.25, γ θ I = 0.05 and (1− γ )θ R = 0.40. The
dilemma is now that they need to vote for S, otherwise R is likely to be elected in s,
but if too many independent citizens vote for S, R could fail to be elected in r . The
optimal strategy looks like this: with probability 0.625, they vote for S, otherwise they
abstain. As a result, R is expected to receive (25+5=) 30% of votes, and S (0.625*40=)
25%, in r , and the expected outcome is reversed in s, the desired outcome. As a result,
the outcome always coincides with the planner’s preferred candidate.
This will no longer be the case with the participation quorum, as can be appreciated
from the next theorem.
Theorem 2 The set of population parameters for which the outcome of the election
coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences is larger under a qˆ-
approval quorum with qˆ = q than a q-participation quorum even when independent
citizens’ preferences depend on an uncertain state of Nature.
Proof See the “Appendix”. unionsq
Again, let us illustrate the reasoning numerically. First, there is a region of
parameters where S is elected in s whereas the planner prefers R. Assume that
q = 0.20, θ R = 0.15, γ θ I = 0.03 and (1 − γ )θ I = 0.06. What is the best
strategy of the informed independents? Let us begin by assuming that all the unin-
formed independents vote for S. Then, the quorum is expected to be reached in both
states of nature, because at least (15+6=) 21% of the voters vote. Without the vote of
informed independents, R is expected to win in both cases. In r , there is no ambigu-
ity, informed citizens vote for R. In s, however, given the large victory margin of R
over S (15% over 6%), whereas the quorum is not passed by much, the most likely
tie is that an additional vote makes the quorum be reached. Consequently, informed
independents decide to abstain in s. Knowing that, it is not rational for the uninformed
independents to vote for S with certainty. By voting for S with only, say, 0.67% of
probability, they guarantee that R is elected in r (the quorum is likely to be reached, as
(15+3+0.67*6=) 22% of citizens show up), and, simultaneously, they keep the proba-
bility that the quorum is reached in s sufficiently low, as only 19% of the citizens are
expected to participate.
13 All the percentage of votes in these examples are expressed as ratios of the expected total number of
potential voters in the population, n.
123
Approval quorums dominate participation quorums 19
Second, there is a region where R is elected in s whereas the planner prefers S.
Assume that q = 0.20, θ R = 0.22, γ θ I = 0.05 and (1 − γ )θ R = 0.40. As above,
it is likely that informed citizens decide to vote for R in r and abstain in s. This is
especially made rational if all uninformed citizens decide to abstain. They all know,
indeed, that R is expected to win in r , as it obtains 27% of votes. Abstention is rational
even in s, though, as the most likely tie is that an additional vote makes the quorum
be reached.
These two regions of parameters are similar to the ones identified in the previous
section. In each of them an undesired equilibrium exists, supporting the outcome that
the planner would like to avoid.
6 Concluding remarks
We have proven that approval quorums, by giving citizens the incentive to vote sin-
cerely, protect the status quo in a better way than participation quorums even if the
preferences of the planner are consistent with what sincere voting would yield under
participation quorums. Whether the objective of elections is to aggregate preferences
or to aggregate information, we have shown that the result is unchanged.
Our dominance result is strict when the participation quorum is less than 50 percent.
In such cases (Azerbaijan has a 25% participation quorum) the policy conclusion of
this paper is clear: switch towards an approval quorum.However, even if the alternative
is a participation quorum greater than or equal than 50 percent, the weak dominance
should, in our view, be considered a strong enough argument to favor approval quorum
rules, given that it is unlikely that everybody will always share the view that the
appropriate legitimacy concern should be the one embedded in participation quorum
social preferences.
Our starting point was that protecting the status quo is a common objective for
the electoral designer. However, we have simply assumed such an objective, without
trying to derive it endogenously. Also, the paper does not design the electoral rules that
would implement the participation quorum social preferences fully (AQER does better
at that thanPQER,butwithout achieving full implementationofPQSP). Finally, voters’
preferences are exogenous in this paper. That is, we did not consider the possibility that
lobbyists or opinion leaders could design the initiative in such a way to maximize the
chance of winning. Modeling this step in a two-stage game raises technical problems,
due to the difficulty in computing the magnitude of pivotal events in the presence of
a participation quorum.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2 Let us begin with a complete description of the best reply corre-
spondence of a citizen of type S. For this exercise, let θ Sn denote the expected size of
the population of other citizens of type S. Let us assume that the symmetric strategy
of these other citizens is σ , so that the number of actual votes in favor of S, NS , is
Poisson distributed with mean σθ Sn. We already know that the number of actual votes
in favor of R, N R , is Poisson distributed with mean θ Rn. By voting for S, a citizen
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can be pivotal in favor of S if NS = N R − 1 and NS + N R ≥ qn, and she may be
pivotal in favor of R if NS < N R − 1 and NS + N R = qn − 1. Let us refer to the





































(qn − k − 1)!
where int (x) stands for the integer value of x . We look at equilibrium for n sufficiently
large. As n becomes larger, the probabilities of Piv1 and Piv2 tend to 0. Let μ1, μ2
denote the magnitude of these events, that is, the speed at which they tend to zero, that






The event with the largest magnitude will necessarily be more likely than the other one
for n sufficiently large (that is precisely the meaning of n being sufficiently large). Let
us compute these magnitudes. Using Theorem 1 in Myerson (2000), we know that the
magnitude of such an event is identical to the magnitude of the most likely subevent,











under the constraint that k ≥ int ( qn2
)
, and the exact sequence of numbers NS = k
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− 1, respectively, where ψ(x) = x(1 −
ln x) − 1. Let k1 and k2 denote the arguments maximizing the above expressions,
respectively. Simple derivation leads to
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Observe that the second critical value of k1 can be approximated by its limit value√
σθ Sθ Rn. In the case where
√
σθ Sθ R ≤ q2 , k1 tends towards its first critical valueqn
2 , assuming
qn
2 is an integer. Event Piv1, that is, a tie between R and S, is more







































































μ1 = q − q ln q + q ln 2
√
σθ Sθ R − (σθ S + θ R). (1)
Similar computations lead to the following magnitude equations. If
√
σθ Sθ R >
q
2 ,
k1 tends towards its second critical value, n
√
σθ Sθ R , and
μ1 = 2
√
σθ Sθ R − (σθ S + θ R). (2)
If k2 tends to
qn
2 − 1, then
μ2 = q − q ln q + q ln 2
√
σθ Sθ R − (σθ S + θ R). (3)
If k2 tends to
σθ Sqn
σθ S+θ R , then
μ2 = q − q ln q + q ln(σθ S + θ R) − (σθ S + θ R). (4)
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Region 1. θ S < θ R and θ S + θ R < q. In this region, k1 tends to qn2 and k2 tends
to σθ
Sqn
σθ S+θ R . Consequently, μ1 < μ2 (as the geometric mean
√
σθ Sθ R is
always smaller than the arithmetic mean σθ
S+θ R
2 ). Independently of σ , a
citizen has incentive to abstain. The only equilibrium, therefore, is σ = 0,
and the expected outcome is S.
Region 2. θ S ≥ θ R and θ S + θ R < q: in this region, k1 tends to qn2 , and k2
tends to either value. If it tends to σθ
Sqn
σθ S+θ R , then the same reasoning as
above holds, and σ = 0 is the only equilibrium. If it tends to qn2 − 1,
then μ1 = μ2. The probabilities of Piv1 and Piv2 tend to zero at the
same speed, but that does not mean that they are equal. Actually, the most
likely subevent of Piv1 and Piv2 are when NS = N R − 1 = int ( qn2 )
and NS = int ( qn+12 ) − 2, N R = int ( qn2 ) + 1 respectively. In both
cases, N R takes the same value, so that Prob(Piv1) > Prob(Piv2) ⇔
Prob(NS = int ( qn2 )) > Prob(NS = int ( qn+12 ) − 2). Consequently,
Prob(Piv1) > Prob(Piv2) ⇔ σθ Sn > qn2 − 1. That shows that there
is an equilibrium with σ = qn−2
2θ Sn
. But this equilibrium is unstable: for
any slight decrease (resp., increase) in σ , μ1 < μ2 (resp., μ1 > μ2) and
abstaining (resp., voting for S) is a best reply. So we have two stable sym-
metric equilibria in this region, namely σ = 0 and σ = 1. In both cases, the
expected outcome is S, as the number of voters in favor of R is expected
to be below the quorum, and the total expected number of votes for S if
all S supporters vote for S is larger than the expected number of votes
for R.
Region 3. θ S < θ R < q < θ S+θ R : in this region, k2 tends to σθ Sqnσθ S+θ R . If
√
σθ Sθ R <
q
2 , then k1 tends to
qn
2 and μ1 < μ2 and a citizen maximizes her utility by
abstaining. If
√
σθ Sθ R ≥ q2 , then k1 tends to n
√
σθ Sθ R . We may, again,
have a mixed strategy equilibrium with μ1 = μ2 and
2
√
σθ Sθ R = q − q ln q + q ln(σθ S + θ R).









σθ S + θ R ,
and, as q < 2
√








θ R − σθ S
σθ S + θ R > 0,
where the last inequality comes from θ S < θ R and σ ≤ 1. So, only
σ = 0 and σ = 1 are equilibrium candidates. If σ = 0, then μ1 < μ2
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and abstaining is an equilibrium in the whole region, with outcome S.
If σ = 1, then μ1 > μ2 if and only if
√
θ Sθ R ≥ q2 and 2
√
θ Sθ R >
q − q ln q + q ln(θ S + θ R). In this subregion, voting for S is also an
equilibrium, and the expected outcome is R. To sum up, in this region,
where the planner always prefers R, there is always an equilibrium with
outcome S and in one subregion it is the only equilibrium outcome.
Region 4. θ S > θ R , θ R < q < θ S + θ R : in this region, both k1 and k2 can converge
towards any of their respective values. By the same argument as above, we
can prove that there are two equilibria, σ = 0 and σ = 1, but the expected
outcomes associated to these equilibria are both S, as either the quorum is
not reached in equilibrium (if all S supporters abstain) or S gets more votes
than R (if all S supporters actually vote). There is also a mixed strategy
equilibrium, which, for the same reason as above, is unstable.
Region 5. θ S < θ R and θ R > q: independently of the optimal strategy of citizens
of type S, the expected outcome is R, as citizens of type R are numerous
enough to reach the quorum and they are more numerous than citizens of
type S.
Region 6. θ S > θ R > q. Let us look immediately at the two extreme equilibrium can-
didates, σ = 0 and σ = 1. In the former case, k1 and k2 converge towards
qn
2 and 0 respectively, so that unambiguously μ1 < μ2, and abstaining is a
best reply. This is, therefore, an equilibrium, with expected outcome R, as
θ Rn > qn. This is the most surprising equilibrium of this game form. The
reform is passed, whereas more citizens strictly prefer S to R than R to S.
If σ = 1, then k1 and k2 converge to n
√
θ Sθ R and qn2 − 1 respectively.
Then, μ1 > μ2 if and only if
2
√
σθ Sθ R − q + q ln q − q ln(σθ S + θ R) > 0,
but this is always the case, as the inequality holds for θ S = θ R = q
(the smallest values of these parameters in region 6) and the expression is
increasing in both θ S and θ R . This proves that σ = 1 is an equilibrium,
and the equilibrium outcome is S. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 3 The same kind of computations as in the above proof reveal that in






λR|iλS|i − (λR|i + λS|i ), (5)
whereas, if
√
λR|iλS|i ≤ q, then the most likely subevent of Piv1 occurs when k tends
to qn, and
μ1|i = 2q − 2q ln q + q ln λR|iλS|i − (λR|i + λS|i ). (6)
If λS|i ≤ q, then the most likely subevent of Piv2 occurs when k tends to λS|i n (its
most likely value), and
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μ2|i = q − q ln q + q ln λR|i − λR|i , (7)
whereas, if λS|i ≥ q, then the most likely subevent of Piv2 occurs when k tends to
qn − 1, and
μ2|i = 2q − 2q ln q + q ln λR|iλS|i − (λR|i + λS|i ). (8)
Having computed the magnitudes, we prove first that it is impossible that S wins
in state r when θ R + θ I ≥ q. Note that this only happens if σR < 1. We have to
distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: λS|r ≥ λR|r ≥ q. That clearly requires σS > 0. Given the dominant strategy
of the informed independent citizens, we have λS|s > λS|r ≥ λR|r > λR|s . Magnitude




λR|rλS|r > 2q − 2q ln q + q ln λR|rλS|r ,
or
√
λR|rλS|r − q ln
√
λR|rλS|r > q − q ln q,
which follows from the fact that function x−q ln x is increasing for x > q. Magnitude
μ1|s may be given either by Eq. (5), inwhich caseμ1|r > μ1|s follows fromλS|rλR|r >
λS|sλR|s (remember thatλS|r+λR|r = λS|s+λR|s), or by (6), inwhich caseμ1|r > μ1|s
follows from the same argument as for μ2|r above. Obviously, μ2|r > μ2|s , so that
it is clear that μ1|r > μ2|s . Consequently, conditional on her vote being pivotal, an
uninformed independent citizen is sure to be in state r , so that σS > 0 is not a best
reply, a contradiction.
Case 2: λR|r < q. Again, it is crucial that λS|s = λS|r + γ θ I , and λR|r = λR|s + γ θ I .
If λS|r is such that
√
λS|rλR|r ≥ q, then we are back to a case similar to the one
above, and σS > 0 cannot be a best reply. If q ≤ λS|r ≤ q2λR|r , then μ1|r = μ2|r (given
by Eqs. (6) and (8)). Magnitudes μ1|s and μ2|s are given by the same equations, so
that μ1|r > μ1|s, μ2|s follows from λS|rλR|r > λS|sλR|s . If λS|r < q, then μ2|r is
given by Eq. (7); μ2|r > μ2|s follows from λR|s < λR|r and the fact that function
x − q ln x is decreasing for x < q. The fact that Piv1 are less likely than Piv2
is immediate and comes from the fact that Piv1 occurs when the votes for R just
reaches the quorum (same requirement as Piv2) and there is a tie between R and S.
Consequently, conditional on her vote being pivotal, an uninformed independent voter
is sure to be in state r , proving that σR < 1 is not a best reply, a contradiction. Note
that this also shows that if λR|r < q, the best reply is σS = 0: uninformed citizens
don’t vote for S, (but may vote for R), using the quorum as a guarantee that S will
win the election in s.
Second, we prove that it is impossible that R wins in state s when θ R < θ I . That
occurs if λR|s > q, λS|s, which implies that σS < 1. Note that λR|r = λR|s + γ θ I >
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λR|s > q, so that clearly μ2|s > μ2|r . Also, λR|r > λR|s > q, λS|s > λS|r makes
it clear that μ1|s > μ1|r . Consequently (independently on how Piv1 and Piv2 are
ranked), state s is infinitely more likely than r conditional on her vote being pivotal,
so an uninformed independent citizen votes for S, so that σS < 1 is not a best reply.
unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 Lemma 3 shows that a qˆ-approval quorum always gives the out-
come that coincides with the qˆ-approval social preferences. Consequently, in state r ,
it also coincides with the q-participation quorum social preferences, with qˆ = q, as
they are the same in that state. We simply need to show that approval quorum does
better than participation quorum in state s. Let us restrict ourselves to proving that the
undesired equilibria (leading to S being chosen in Region 3 and R being chosen in
Region 6) highlighted in Theorem 1 still prevails under the current assumptions.
Claim 1: an equilibrium exists such that S is elected in s, whereas θ R < q, θ R > θ I
and θ R + θ I ≤ q. Let σ ∗S ≥ 0 be defined by θ R + σ ∗S (1− γ )θ I < q < θ R + (σ ∗S (1−
γ ) + γ )θ I , and
Prob(N R + NS = qn − 1|R) = Prob(N R + NS = qn − 1|S),
that is,
e−[θ R+(σ ∗S (1−γ )+γ )θ I ]n([θ R + (σ ∗S (1 − γ ) + γ )θ I ]n)qn−1
(qn − 1)!
= e
−[θ R+(σ ∗S (1−γ ))θ I ]n([θ R + (σ ∗S (1 − γ ))θ I ]n)qn−1








(1 − γ )θ I







Weclaim that informed independents playing (R,∅), and the uninformed independents
playing σ ∗S is an equilibrium. By definition of σ ∗S , Prob(Piv2|r) = Prob(Piv2|s).
Clearly, Prob(Piv1|i) < Prob(Piv2|i), all i ∈ {r, s}, as a Piv1 event requires a tie
between R and S and that the quorum be reached. When informed citizens observe
the state is r , they clearly vote for R. When they observe s, given that Prob(Piv1|s) <
Prob(Piv2|s), they prefer abstaining. Uninformed citizens do not observe the state.
Conditional on their vote being pivotal, they are sure that they face a Piv2 event,
so that, as n → ∞, they tend to be indifferent between voting for S and abstaining.
That equilibrium is stable: if σS < σ ∗S , (resp., σS > σ ∗S ) then Prob(Piv2|r) >
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Prob(Piv2|s) (resp., Prob(Piv2|r) < Prob(Piv2|s)) so that citizens prefer voting
for S (resp. abstaining).
Claim 2: an equilibrium exists such that R is elected in s, whereas θ R < θ I .
Assume q < θ R < θ I . We claim that, like in the public information framework of
the previous sections, we have an equilibrium where independent uninformed citizens
prefer S but abstain, as voting for S could make R win the election. Let us prove that
informed independents playing (R,∅), and the uninformed independents playing ∅
is an equilibrium. As λR|r = λR|s + γ θ I > λR|s > q and λS|r = λS|s = 0, we
have μ2|s > μ2|r > μ1|s, μ1|r . In state s, given that μ2|s > μ1|s, any independent
citizen prefers to abstain. As informed citizens observe the state of nature, voting for
R in r and abstaining in s is a best reply. Conditional on her vote being pivotal, an
uninformed independent citizen is sure to be in state s, so that abstaining is her best
reply. unionsq
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